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Abstract 
 
Service-dominant logic highlights the ability of 
service ecosystems to ‘self-adjust’ as a reaction to sys-
temic inefficiencies or external changes [1]–[3]. We 
contribute to the question on how focal actors shape 
the boundaries of service ecosystems through service 
innovation. This is a single case study on a digital eco-
system focused on a first mover in digital platforms for 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs): Udacity. We 
found two mechanisms, where Udacity shaped the 
boundaries of its ecosystem: ‘user self-service integra-
tion’ and ‘gradual partner disintegration’. Through-
out three phases between 2011 and 2015 they disinte-
grated services from higher education, namely offer-
ing courses online, designing course, and accredita-
tion due to lowly perceived adaptability of universities 
and external pressures for finding a sustainable busi-
ness model. Additionally, they disintegrated self-orga-
nized solutions of user needs and re-integrated them 
with new actors. This led to newly shaped boundaries 
of the service ecosystem. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
‘In the beginning we tried to work with universities 
and anybody who does an education startup, think 
twice. Because you are dealing with a super glacially 
slow system. […] Then we went the gutsy way and 
said, let's ditch all the university, essentially.’ [4].  
2011 was the year, when founders of Udacity pub-
lished a course about Artificial Intelligence freely on 
the web and attracted more than 160,000 participants. 
According to New York Times information, Anant 
Agarwal, CEO of edX, called the following year 2012 
the ‘year of disruption’ [5] for the educational sector. 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are educa-
tional services based upon information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT). Single institutions sel-
domly design, deploy, distribute and use these courses 
completely on their own. Instead, they reflect types of 
‘business model innovations for educational services 
that are increasingly realized within digital value cre-
ation networks’ [6, p. 112]. MOOC platforms are often-
times at the heart of these services. Sebastian Thrun, who 
started the first MOOC of this kind and founded Udacity, 
stated in 2011, that he wanted to ‘bring education to 
places that can't be reached today, to people that haven't 
had access to higher education’ [7]. These platforms 
changed throughout the years of introduction, initiating 
several service innovations in the field of higher and fur-
ther education. These changes finally led to a situation in 
2013, where Udacity’s founder Sebastian Thrun called his 
own MOOC platform a ‘lousy product’ [8]. While heavily 
relying on value co-creation with actors from higher edu-
cation as an integral part of Udacity’s service offering, the 
composition of Udacity’s service ecosystem changed 
gradually. By September 2015 Udacity offered 88 
MOOCs (27 of them with more than 50,000 learners). 
Many of them, with lecturers from private companies. 
We build on system-theory and choose a (critical) re-
alistic perspective [9] to assess how a digital service pro-
vider shaped the boundaries of its service ecosystem 
through service innovations. In order to form generative 
mechanisms we use a longitudinal, exploratory research 
design as proposed by [10] in qualitative-abductive single 
case study about the first mover for MOOC platforms. We 
analyze the content of more than 700 articles from public 
media, press releases, video statements and the platform 
itself to reveal events and activities by Udacity and related 
actors from 2011 to 2015. To triangulate the data we ana-
lyze public video statements from founders and investors 
of Udacity. As a result, we describe a two generative 
mechanisms of service disintegration and re-aggregation 
by a digital platform in an educational domain.  
 
2. Service Ecosystems 
 
Even though service-dominant logic (sd-logic) can 
hardly be called a ‘new’ paradigm anymore, it is still thor-
oughly discussed in service management and information 
systems (IS) research [2], [11]–[13]. Sd-logic was ini-
tially founded on eight [11] and has later been extended 
to ten premises [12]. Meanwhile these premises have been 
rearranged and centered around four axioms [1], [3]. Each 
premise can be derived from these axioms: (1) ‘Service is 
the fundamental basis of exchange’, (2) ‘The customer is 
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always a co-creator of value’, (3) ‘All economic and 
social actors are resource integrators’, and (4) ‘Value 
is always uniquely and phenomenological determined 
by the beneficiary’. The value co-creation concept lies 
at the core of these premises. It describes the recipro-
cal integration of resources between actors through in-
teractions [3], [14]. 
In the past, sd-logic has already been linked to net-
work theory, relying on the concept of an actor-to-ac-
tor ‘value network’ [15]. This concept was extended 
by highlighting the systemic character of these ‘value 
networks’ through the concept of service ecosystems 
[16]. Vargo and Lusch [3] describe service ecosystems 
as ‘relatively self-contained, self-adjusting systems of 
resource-integrating actors that are connected by 
shared institutional logics and mutual value creation 
through service exchange.’ Each actor is a potential 
source of resources for other actors within the ecosys-
tem [17]. Value co-creative interaction describe inter-
relations between these actors in an ecosystem. Gen-
eral system theory – a theoretical pillar of the service 
ecosystem concept [18] – is concerned with describing 
the interrelations between elements of a system, their 
input, output, and throughput as well as the boundaries 
of a system [19]. 
The environment is a constitutive attribute of a sys-
tem. According to Luhmann [20], a description of in-
teractive behavior between elements in a social system 
is a major parameter to discern between internal and 
external elements. Following his argument, an (auto-
poietic) system reacts to events of its environment 
through adaptive behavior of the elements within the 
system to create itself anew. As we said before, value 
co-creation constitutes the interaction between actors 
within a service ecosystem. Analogous, service eco-
systems are able to adjust through quickly responding 
and evolving actors who are loosely coupled [1], [3]. 
Changes in relationships between two actors may also 
affect other actors, as these changes ripple through the 
network and impose a self-adjusting character of an 
ecosystem [1]. 
In its core, the service ecosystem concept has 
closely been related to service system literature [18], 
which describes the nature of services as a ‘dynamic 
value co-creation configuration of resources’ [21] 
through interdependent value propositions. Service 
ecosystems’ mainly distinguishable character from 
service systems is their open nature. The system ena-
bles actors to improve their current state by integrating 
external resources [18], in this case, the creation of 
weak ties [22] (or loose coupling) through activities of 
value co-creation with new actors. Hence, shaping the 
boundaries of a service ecosystem entails a redefini-
tion of the identity of systemic actors and behavior by 
other actors in the ecosystem, which leads to the inclusion 
or exclusion of services from this ecosystem. 
Literature on service innovation is explicitly con-
cerned with an actor-specific beneficial rebundling of di-
verse resources in order to create new resources [13]. Sd-
logic also assumes that each actor in an actor-to-actor-net-
work shares, transfers and integrates resources as long as 
this seems to be subjectively beneficiary. Hence, service 
innovations regularly occur in co-creational processes.  
This paper focuses on digital services. ICT is at the 
core of these service offerings. Technology is discussed 
as a moderator of value creation processes [1], [23]. It en-
ables ties between actors in an ecosystem and mainly con-
tributes to value creation as a resource on which other re-
sources can be operated – so called, operant resources. 
Based on these ties and due to the underlying principle of 
standardization and automation, digital services can be 
more easily disintegrated into multiple, or re-aggregated 
into single services [2], [24]. Service ecosystems consist 
of various resource-integrating actors, who choose freely 
which resources they use and whom they involve in value 
co-creation process. Hence, a focal service provider may 
find expected as well as unexpected actors and interac-
tions as the service ecosystem evolves [2].  
Prior publications already focused on certain types of 
interrelations between a service ecosystem and service in-
novations. Some authors focused on the co-creation of 
service innovation between customers and focal firms 
[23], [25]–[28]. Others concentrated on the importance of 
inter-organizational ties in collaborations for service in-
novation [26], [29]. Research on how service ecosystems 
‘self-adjust’ is nonetheless scarce. In the following, we 
present a single case study of a service ecosystem cen-
tered by a digital platform service who redefines the way 
its ‘resource-integrating actors’ [3] mutually co-create 
value. 
 
3. Case Study: Udacity 
 
3.1. Research Method 
In order to reveal potential self-adjustments of a ser-
vice ecosystem by its actors, we exploratory depict a pro-
cess on contemporary events. As proposed by Yin [30], 
we subsequently perform a case study research. Accord-
ing to him, single case studies are especially useful if the 
case in question is critical, unusual, common, revelatory, 
or longitudinal. As will be shown in the following chap-
ter, Udacity was a first mover in the field of MOOCs in 
higher education. Later on, Udacity shifted its initial busi-
ness model dramatically towards addressing further edu-
cation. It is therefore a revelatory, longitudinal and critical 
case. 
The foundation of our single case study consists of 
732 news articles and news releases that were published 
between February 2012 and September 2015. We analyze 
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about 3 hours of public video material of Udacity’s 
founders and investors to complement this data set in 
order to triangulate key statements. We collect media 
data with Lexis Nexis and analyze it with Atlas.ti. Ar-
ticles are coded using an actor-centric perspective. To 
assess Udacity’s service ecosystem we assess value 
co-creation behavior between the MOOC platform and 
other actors, in form of mutual value propositions. We 
intend to explore behavior, that led to the inclusion of 
new, or the exclusion of current actors. For this pur-
pose, we categorize events and actions according to a 
business model typology adapted from the Business 
Model Canvas [31], [32]. This typology centers eco-
nomic behavior on value propositions of an actor and 
relates it to key activities, key partners, key resources, 
(customer) channels, customer support, revenue 
streams and costs. Using articles from public media in-
hibits the study, as we are only vaguely able to assess 
internal actions by Udacity, like costs and key re-
sources. We diminish this constraint partly by triangu-
lating the data with public statements of Udacity’s 
founders, investors and partners.  
Since the concept of key partners directly relates to 
actors in a service ecosystem, we discern between ac-
tors directly connected to Udacity (e.g., learners, uni-
versities and partners) and indirectly connected actors 
(e.g., competitors). Even though imitation from com-
petitors is a common motive to choose a business strat-
egy, actions by competitors may have directly influ-
enced customers or partners by rippling down the ser-
vice ecosystem. Subsequently, we also code actions of 
competitors, as they potentially had an indirect impact 
on Udacity’s activities.  
We refine the coding scheme and draw empirical 
findings following an abductive qualitative research 
process. In order to describe the process of Udacity’s 
activities between 2011 and 2015 we use temporal 
bracketing [33] throughout our study. As a result, we 
divide the case into three phases. Each phase describes 
a preferably homogeneous and continuous sequence of 
events which allow for differentiation between those 
phases [33]. In addition to this secondary data set, we 
collect data on the course offerings from Udacity’s 
web page retrospectively for each phase using the In-
ternet Archive (www.archive.org). We use data about 
lecturers, their respective company, course data, and 
degree information to create actor-to-actor networks 
between individuals and organizations in the service 
ecosystem for each phase. Due to data restrictions, in-
formation about students’ numbers are only available 
for the third phase.  
This research thrives to look at the self-adjustment 
of an autopoetic ecosystem. We assume creating (and 
participating) in courses as the continual process, nec-
essary for a self-reproduction of an ecosystem [20]. 
Actors who give lectures therefore represent a core ele-
ment of the service ecosystem. To illustrate the develop-
ment of the ecosystem with regards to this core activity, 
we present graphs of the actor-to-actor network on a mi-
cro-level, also referred to as an ego-network [34], [35]. 
Each circular network – depicted on the following pages 
– represents a compilation from Udacity’s ecosystem with 
respect to alters also participating in the core activity of 
giving courses and being responsible for the MOOC con-
tent. Each node represents an organization and each tie a 
joint course offering between members of these organiza-
tions. The size of each node illustrates the number of em-
ployees engaged in these courses as well as public collab-
orations on course offerings between Udacity and the in-
stitution in question. 
The following chapter gives an overview about the 
case of Udacity using temporal bracketing. For this pur-
pose, we focus on a depiction of focal public actions of 
Udacity, and events influencing its related service eco-
system from 2011 to 2015. 
 
3.2. How to Create a MOOC Platform and 
Overcome a ’Lousy Product’ 
 
3.2.1. First Phase (July 2011 to July 2012) “We believe 
university-level education can be both high quality and 
low cost.” (First line of Udacity’s ‘about us’ page in 2012 
on [36]) 
Udacity’s value proposition: Sebastian Thrun and Pe-
ter Norwig published their course CS221: Introduction to 
Artificial Intelligence in the winter term 2011. It was 
freely available on the web. About 160,000 learners from 
190 countries joined their MOOC. Originally, the course 
was given in English. Shortly afterwards Thrun left Stan-
ford University to concentrate on founding a MOOC plat-
form in January 2012, called Udacity. According to the 
news releases, it was his aim to ‘[…] bring education to 
places that can’t be reached today, to people that haven’t 
had access to higher education” [7] and ‘[…] making ed-
ucation available to the entire world […] absolutely free 
of charge’ [37].  
Udacity’s key activity: The first courses were offered 
in February 2012. As a former Stanford-professor and 
Google manager Sebastian Thrun was able to offer these 
courses largely by himself or with former colleagues from 
the university. Each MOOC focused mainly on technol-
ogy-related content, like web service engineering, cryp-
tography or building a search engine. Hence, courses were 
mainly offered by lecturers from universities (see fig. 1, 
left frame).  
Target group: Udacity explicitly addressed learners 
from all ages and with a variety of prerequisites, including 
students with or without prior IT knowledge, employees 
from different professions as well as elderly. It especially 
focused on BRIC countries to ‘impact lives around the 
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world, for the next billion students from China and In-
dia’ [38].  
Customer channel and support: An automated sys-
tem supported learning processes, which heavily relied 
on video lectures and multiple-choice questions. In-
stead of publishing these videos freely on Youtube, 
Udacity later integrated them into its own platform. 
Peer-to-peer-interaction in live chats, on online discus-
sion boards, and self-organized live meetings on 
Meetup.com facilitated basic support for questions and 
issues. By implementing parts of these services on 
their own, partnering with Open Source Q&A, and the 
official partnership with Meetup.com Service, these 
functions were integrated into Udacity’s platform 
meanwhile. Student groups also met in person by cre-
ating local Meetups. 
Revenue stream: The course offering was free to 
learners. In March 2012, Udacity made first attempts 
to commercialize its recommendations of these ‘thou-
sands of students who have learned these [machine 
learning] skills’ [39] to recruiters worldwide. How-
ever, after July 2012 the MOOC platform gained prof-
its mainly through verified exams. This shift of strat-
egy sets the frame for Udacity’s second phase. 
Directly tied actors: After publishing the course on 
Artificial Intelligence, some learners unexpectedly 
translated the content into 44 other languages using a 
service called Amara. Furthermore, they opened up 
discussion boards on their own.  
Besides having intensive relationships with indi-
vidual professors throughout the initial phase, Udacity 
did not directly cooperate with universities on an insti-
tutional level. To accredit students’ activities despite 
that, they formed a partnership with Pearson VUE. As 
a global partner, Pearson was able to offer offline test cen-
ters for learners on a global scale. Udacity integrated ac-
creditation into its main services and priced each verified 
exam with 89$ at the end of this phase.  
Public media more and more compared Udacity’s ac-
tivities to traditional universities and noticed the compar-
ative cost advantages of MOOCs from 3,000$ (Stanford) 
to 1$ (Udacity)[37] per student, which may strike risks 
especially for institutions with medium or low reputa-
tion[40]. 
Indirectly tied actors: Platform competitors entered 
the newly founded MOOC market shortly after Udacity’s 
founding. MIT created MITx in March and merged their 
platform service with Harvard in May, renaming it into 
edX. Two former colleagues of Thrun, Andrew Ng and 
Daphne Koller, formed Coursera in April. Other compet-
itors, like Minerva and Udemy, followed shortly after-
wards. Udacity’s highest competition came from 
Coursera. They initiated relationships with the University 
of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Stanford U and Princeton U. 
Another twelve universities followed in July 2012. Even 
though Coursera’s number of relationships with universi-
ties rose, they did not create direct profits in this early 
phase, either.  
 
3.2.2. Second Phase (August 2012 to December 2013) 
“Our mission is to bring accessible, affordable, engaging, 
and highly effective higher education to the world. We be-
lieve that higher education is a basic human right, and we 
seek to empower our students to advance their education 
and careers.” (Udacity’s mission statement 2013 in [41]) 
Value proposition: In the first phase, Udacity explored 
mainly the technical and didactical basis of a MOOC plat-
form. A major task of the second phase for all platform 
Figure 1. Service ecosystem related to designing MOOCs on Udacity in 1st and 2nd phase 
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offerings can be described as finding steady revenue 
streams and legitimizing the platforms in the educa-
tional system (mainly in the US). While its value prop-
osition on bringing education to the whole glob – in-
cluding rural areas – has been sharpened at first, con-
flicts within the ecosystem arose. This led Sebastian 
Thrun to declare the way Udacity offered MOOCs un-
til December 2013 a ‘lousy product’ [8]. Concurrently, 
he announced to pivot the business model, no longer 
addressing higher, but further education in the future.  
Key activities: By December 2013, Udacity of-
fered 33 courses on computer science, physics and 
business administration. 
Target group and customer support: At the end of 
this phase, Udacity was confronted with high dropout 
rates and noticed a growing misfit between their ser-
vices and the target group. Many learners ‘didn’t have 
computers and high-speed Internet [sic] connections at 
home that the online course required’ [42]. Their 
MOOC topics, the technology adapted by Udacity as 
well as a lack of intensive support did not necessarily 
match to early student target groups, especially in 
BRIC countries. Udacity experienced a misfit in their 
current target group perception, as ‘about 80 percent 
of those taking the university’s MOOCs had already 
earned a degree of some kind’ [43]. Those students ask 
for advanced training in cutting-edge methods and 
technologies in order to raise their employability.  
Directly tied actors: Translation of the courses that 
allowed internalization was unexpectedly organized 
and fostered by learners in the first phase. Until Feb-
ruary 2012, ‘volunteers have translated more than 
1,200 videos, all through a grassroots movement 
started by students for students’ [44]. This led to an 
official partnership between Udacity and the transla-
tion platform Amara adding further customer support.  
A joint partnership with LinkedIn (and the other 
MOOC platforms) to add “direct-to-profile certifica-
tion” at the end of this phase already displays a new 
paradigm on raising and showing employability 
through MOOC participation. 
As the first university of the United States, Colo-
rado State University offered credits for students of 
their curricula, who participated in a MOOC (on Udac-
ity). For this purpose, students took exams held in 
Pearson test centers. Udacity extended their univer-
sity-partnership gradually during this phase. In Janu-
ary 2013, Californian governor, Jerry Brown, an-
nounced a cooperation of San Jose State University 
(SJSU) and Udacity to offer a complete online degree 
program. In March 2013, the proposed Senate Bill 520 
was meant to open the possibility for universities to 
complement their current course offering with 
MOOCs, if students ‘could not get a seat in the course 
they needed’ [45].  
Simultaneously, the tendency towards integrating 
MOOCs into university’s curricula led to an upcoming 
critique from professors and university employees. They 
remarked a standardization of learning processes, and a 
lack of interactions between educators and learners, 
which subsequently leads to a diminished educational 
quality. High dropout rates of MOOC participants sup-
ported their argument. This culminated in an open letter 
from the philosophical department of SJSU to Michael 
Sandel (Harvard) in April 2013. Additionally, professors 
remarked that cost reductions in higher education may be 
‘used as an excuse for state legislatures to cut funding to 
state universities’ [46]. Hence, ‘[p]rofessors who care 
about public education should not produce products that 
will replace professors, dismantle departments and pro-
vide a diminished education for student in public univer-
sities’ [47]. Lecturers and unions opposed MOOCs more 
openly during this phase [48]. The public perceived Udac-
ity as a front-runner of the MOOC movement, and it at-
tached critique on these course types oftentimes to Sebas-
tian Thrun and his company. As conflicts with universi-
ties rose in public media and private messages, Thrun per-
ceived himself as ‘the most hated professor of America, 
because every other professor was fearing for their job’ 
[4]. Finally, Udacity and SJSU suspended their collabora-
tion on joint courses for a semester and did not extend its 
collaboration to further courses. 
Later this year, in May 2013, Udacity announced an 
online degree program with Georgia Tech. They wanted 
to evaluate the question whether MOOCS can ‘make ed-
ucation more affordable and help diffuse online media 
into higher education’ [48]. Within this cooperation, and 
for the first time, they directly collaborated with a private 
company on a course offering: AT&T. They followed a 
strategy Thrun already explained in December 2012 [49]. 
According to Thrun, ‘new technologies come on to the 
market at a very fast pace today and the universities can't 
keep up. So they [the companies] want us [Udacity] to 
step up and help’ [50].  
Due to perceived lacks of adaptability to learners’ and 
company’s demands from traditional university teaching, 
Udacity began to exploit experiences with online learning 
and their platform. The cooperation with AT&T, as well 
as their direct financial backing of about 2 million $ ‘[…] 
embark on a new era for higher education and for the de-
velopment of a highly skilled work force’ [51]. 
Indirectly tied actors: In September 2012, edX fol-
lowed Udacity’s lead to cooperate with Pearson VUE to 
make use of their test centers. Coursera on the other hand 
collaborated directly with universities to offer accredited 
exams at their campuses. By the end of 2012, Coursera 
already had twice the user base of Udacity. In May 2013, 
they announced 5 Mio learners on their platform. One ex-
planation of the comparable success is the variety of top-
ics taught by the 204 courses on Coursera at this time. 
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They also launched a mobile application by the end of 
the second phase as a new customer channel. Further-
more, Coursera – as well as edX – created licensing 
models for universities to use the platform as an inter-
nal course management system. EdX also commercial-
ized subservices, like course translations and technical 
consultancy, for universities. 
 
3.2.3. Third Phase (January 2014 to September 
2015) ‘[…] Education is no longer a one-time event 
but a lifelong experience. […] Education should em-
power students to succeed not just in school but in life’ 
(Addition to the mission statement in 2015 on [52]) 
Value proposition and target group: A third phase 
(January 2014 to September 2015) of this case study 
was initiated by two events. Sebastian Thrun stated to 
pivot Udacity’s business model at the end of 2013 to-
wards further education in a technology related field. 
Therefore, they created Nanodegrees, a valued creden-
tial that raises employability. This new value proposi-
tion was set up for learners who long for knowledge 
and competences in a technology-related profession, 
which guarantees a subsequent job entry in this field. 
Key activities: At the beginning of this phase, 
Georgia Tech, AT&T and Udacity launched their prior 
announced online degree program. Supported by about 
35 million $ from investors, Udacity secured the finan-
cial backup to creating further online degrees – called 
Nanodegree – either with private companies or on 
their own. Throughout this phase 57 courses were created. 
Additionally, Udacity began to create and offer more 
courses completely on their own (19 courses, opposing 
three in the second phase, and two in the first). 
Customer channels and support: In order to reach 
their target group, Udacity complemented its web plat-
form by an iOS and an Android app for engaging with 
learners on mobile devices. It was their expressed hope, 
that caching learning materials locally on a mobile device 
would lower entry barriers for users who do not have 
steady internet access. They found this to be a critical 
need for learners in the global south. Additional customer 
support was offered to students within their Nanodegree 
program (see below). Furthermore they reacted to new re-
quirements to their discussion board, especially with re-
gards to a growing amount of spam messages, by chang-
ing their open source platform OSQA for Discourse. With 
the addition of new Nanodegrees, Udacity also emanci-
pated partly from Youtube, by adding Vimeo to the ser-
vice ecosystem. 
Revenue stream: Udacity acquired new revenue 
streams by partnering with Georgia Tech and private 
companies. The new Nanodegree program is built upon a 
subscription model (200$/month for a year). The Online 
Master Degree creates 6,600$ per student for Udacity and 
Georgia Tech. To gain an individual certificate from 
Georgia Tech costs 399$ per course.  
Figure 2. Service ecosystem related to designing MOOCs on Udacity in 3rd phase 
3rd p ase 
5260
Directly tied actors: In January 2014, Udacity, 
Georgia Tech and AT&T launched their first joint de-
gree program. Participants of the Online Master pro-
gram got additional access to tutors and projects from 
Georgia Tech. Students within the individual certifi-
cate program were able to contact professors and par-
take official exams. 
In June 2014, Udacity initiated their Nanodegree 
program in cooperation with several private technol-
ogy-related companies (see table 1). They used these 
partnerships to design an online curricula ‘by business 
for the specific skills that are needed in business’ [53]. 
AT&T helped Udacity explicate their new value prop-
osition by offering ‘up to 100 paid internships for 
nanodegree graduates’[54]. According to Udacity the 
motivation of learners heading for a Nanodegree show 
‘[…] double the engagement, double the progress, 
more than double the retention rate’ [55]. About 7000 
users registered for a Nanodegree by February 2015. 
Each learner spent six to nine months until completion.  
Table 1. Degree partners in the 3rd phase 
 
Within the third phase, Udacity largely decoupled 
from university collaborations in favor of diverse and 
intensive partnerships with technology-related compa-
nies, like Google, Salesforce, Cloudera and AT&T. 
Many employees of the platform (co-)tutored univer-
sity courses on the platform before. Now they offered 
the technical knowledge and skills acquired until this 
point to firms. For the new courses they took over the 
design and implementation of the courses with part-
ners from private companies instead. From this point 
on, Udacity publicly branded newly developed and al-
ready existing courses co-created with private compa-
nies and universities as “created by [company]”. 
Indirectly tied actors: Coursera (Specializations) 
and edX (XSeries) introduced online degrees at the be-
ginning of 2014. For this purpose, university partners 
compiled multiple MOOCs into their programs. 
In addition, they kept a freemium model. 
Both platforms offered single MOOCs freely available for 
learners. They only had to pay fees for verified exams. As 
part of these so-called Signature Tracks, Coursera explic-
itly turned towards further education for internal use of 
private companies in 2014. 
 
4. Case Summary and Conclusion 
 
4.1. Two Mechanisms of Reshaping a Service 
Ecosystem 
 
As the case study shows, we found three phases in 
which Udacity gradually changed the collection of actors 
participating in co-creation activities of its core services. 
In its first phase Udacity launched a platform service to 
offer knowledge openly and freely to learners from all 
over the world. For this purpose they collaborated with 
universities. Individual lecturers and whole institutions 
were invited to join in designing and offering courses to 
their students. In parallel, Udacity needed to develop a 
value proposition related to a sustainable revenue model, 
which led to the introduction of certificates following a 
freemium concept.  
Throughout the second phase, they experienced insti-
tutions in higher education as being too slow, to answer 
the needs articulated by paying learners and private com-
panies. They struggled with university partners and 
moved towards integrating private companies more 
deeply into their core activities. After calling its own ser-
vice offer a ‘lousy product’, the MOOC platform pivoted. 
The target group was narrowed down towards people in 
further education who reach out for technology-related 
professions and fostering employability. Within both 
phases, new actors were integrated into the service eco-
system to keep up the service offer. In order to subsume 
changes of actor constellation and resource allocations, 
we form two generative mechanisms [10]. These explain 
how a value co-creative process of designing MOOCs in 
the ecosystem led to the integration of formerly external 
actors, we call them (1) ‘user self-service integration’, and 
(2) ‘gradual partner disintegration’.  
If users perceive a lack with their current service ex-
change, some of them solve these issue on their own. 
‘User self-service integration’ describes a mechanism, 
where solutions are recognized by a focal service provider 
and integrated as part of its value proposition – either by 
adding it to its own key activities or integrating it with the 
help of new actors. We found two occasions for this 
mechanism. Learners in MOOCs co-create value as they 
intentionally and unintentionally enrich Udacity’s educa-
tional service offer and data sets – not only through peer-
to-peer-tutoring. While Udacity’s founders initially disin-
tegrated the traditional university lecture into a video 
stream that was uploaded by a few lecturers to the web, 
(1a) students created complementary discussion boards 
Degree Name Degree Partners 
Online Master of Science in 
Computer Science  
AT&T, Georgia Tech 
Georgia Tech Degree Certifi-
cate Program 
AT&T, Georgia Tech 
Introduction to Programming No additional partner 
Front-End Web Developer AT&T, Google, Hack Re-
actor, GitHub 
Data Analyst Google, MongoDB, Face-
book, Zipfian Academy 
iOS Developer AT&T 
Full Stack Web Developer AT&T, Google, Amazon 
Web Services, GitHub 
Android Developer Google 
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and live meetings throughout the first phase. Later on, 
Udacity integrated these resources through internali-
zation of video streaming, content distribution and 
online discussion functions into its own MOOC plat-
form. For this purpose, they adapted external services, 
from YouTube (Vimeo), Meetup.com, Open Source 
Q&A, and Discourse to their platform. (1b) Learners 
also improved the video and text-based content by un-
expectedly translating subtitles on their own. Udacity 
reacted in the second phase, as they officially part-
nered with the crowd-translation platform Amara.  
In cases where a focal service sees current service 
exchanges as inferior, it may choose to follow a ‘grad-
ual partner disintegration’ in order to acquire re-
sources from an external actor, instead. Relationship 
between Udacity and its university partners went from 
complementary to substitutive over the time observed 
in this case study. Within the first phase Udacity’s 
value proposition mainly complemented university of-
fering within their core market (higher education). 
Universities offered the content, Udacity published it 
to a large target group on the web and gave technical 
support. (2a) But unlike edX or Coursera until this 
point, Udacity began to substitute one of universities 
core value propositions – accreditation and examina-
tion – with the help of a private company partner, Pear-
son VUE. Within the second phase, Udacity initiated 
partnerships with universities to offer online degrees. 
The degree itself was still accredited by the universi-
ties. Their first try to make MOOCs part of university 
curricular with SJSU was nevertheless suspended at 
first and not further extended later on. With the begin-
ning of its third phase Udacity partnered with Georgia 
Tech to offer a full online master’s degree. Since 2014 
no extensions to university collaborations were scarce. 
Instead, Udacity laid the foundation to further disinte-
grate this resource from higher education by substitut-
ing traditional degree programs, they call Nanodegree.  
As Udacity directly complemented more and more 
of universities core services, public media and individ-
ual professors criticized high dropout rates and their 
perception of low educational quality. Competitors, 
like Coursera, offered by far more MOOCs with the 
help of a multitude of professors from a variety of uni-
versities across the US – and beyond both oceans. 
Hence, we could assume that the perceived influence 
on the debate on educational quality of MOOCs may 
also be influenced by competitor’s actions. We assume 
from the discussion within the media and Sebastian 
Thrun’s retrospective statements, that the ongoing de-
bate about dropouts and the lack of quality of MOOCs 
in general had an impact on Udacity’s decision to 
change their value proposition towards targeting aca-
demics and professionals. 
Table 2. Course and partner development  
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
No. of 
Courses 
11 33 90 
Number of Lecturers per Institution 
 
Company 2 19 (+17) 51 (+32) 
University 6 22 (+16) 34 (+12) 
Udacity 6 15 (+9) 33 (+18) 
Sums 14 56 118 
 
 (2b) In parallel, Udacity began collaborating with pri-
vate companies in the field of ICT on the content of a 
MOOC. Instead of deeply integrating university employ-
ees and professors into their MOOC service offering, 
Udacity partnered with ‘industry leaders’, like Google, 
Facebook, Salesforce, NVIDIA, mongoDB, and AT&T, 
in the third phase (see table 2). Competitors, like Coursera 
or edX, also integrate industry partners into their Special-
izations from time to time. In comparison, their platforms 
nevertheless always set individuals from universities into 
the heart of their MOOC programs. In contrast, Udacity 
co-created its core services with private companies, as 
they set and design MOOCs and Nanodegrees. Further-
more, they provide case studies and exercises based on 
practical issues using their own services and platforms – 
e.g., Android OS, Facebook Open Graph, or NVIDIA’s 
CUDA platform on parallel computing – as course mate-
rials. In order to be able to teach these current and specific 
methods and technologies to a highly specialized target 
group, Udacity offered their accumulated knowledge and 
skillset in designing online courses with these firms. 
Thus, Udacity shifted towards further education and be-
came less a complementary to universities, but aimed at 
becoming a substitute. They focused on raising employa-
bility. Their motivation was described as ‘unbundling’ 
higher from further education to prepare for a time, where 
having ‘a PhD or an MA or even a BA won’t be a job 
requirement’ [56]. As a result, 57 out of 90 MOOCs were 
offered without any university participation by September 
2015. 
 
4.2. Conclusion and Implications 
 
Agility and adaptability of actors ensures sustainabil-
ity of a service ecosystem by fostering its ability on an 
elemental level to self-adjust in cases of external changes 
or restraints that lead to subjective inefficiencies [1], [13]. 
This case study explores self-adjustment in an educational 
service ecosystem. Creating online courses are described 
as autopoetic processes of self-production. By presenting 
the development of Udacity from 2011 to 2015, we exem-
plify two generative mechanisms that led to a reformation 
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of actors in the ecosystem: (1) ‘user self-service inte-
gration’ and (2) ‘gradual partner disintegration’. We 
exhibit how students, universities, and private compa-
nies – as actors within the service ecosystem – added 
resources to the ecosystem while creating MOOCs, 
that were disintegrated by a focal service provider at 
first and reintegrated, later on, with external actors. 
This focal service provider recognized users, who per-
ceived a relevant demand and solved it on their own. 
Then it reintegrated this resource as part of a ‘user self-
service integration’. Udacity integrated student-based 
discussion boards, translation services and local meet-
ings with the help of new actors. Other core resources 
were reallocated from partners, which were perceived 
as being not adaptable, rigid or too slow as part of a 
‘gradual partner disintegration’. With regards to Udac-
ity, the role from institutions in higher education as a 
complementary source of resources changed into be-
coming substitutive. They gradually replaced services 
from universities, like course content, design, and ac-
creditation, with private firms. This paper sheds light 
on mechanisms of self-adjustment in service ecosys-
tems [1], [13]. It extends our understanding of service 
rebundling [13], disintegration and reaggregation [2], 
[24] over time and how focal actors may use these to 
reshape the boundaries of a service ecosystem.  
Especially due to limitations on external validity, 
we mainly hold managerial implications for the edu-
cational sector. The case study shows how the fields 
of higher and further education entangle over time. 
The capacity of companies to exploit new technologies 
by disintegrating key activities from partners (here 
universities) gives the opportunity to integrate new ac-
tors into an ecosystem. Even though power was only 
vaguely referred to in this article, we may presume, 
that especially platform owners want to explore strat-
egies of fast (out)learning from partners with unique 
resources (here universities or lecturers), before sup-
porting a process of gradual disintegration and reag-
gregation. As such, we may also shed light on possible 
extensions to a strategizing debate on digital platforms 
[57]. This is also a call onto service providers to spot 
and realize self-solutions by end users, not only of 
their own, but also for direct co-creators. Udacity was 
able to gain more control over otherwise concealed 
end user-activity, by partnering with crowd-translation 
organization Amara, Meetup.com, or by integrating 
discussion board applications into their digital plat-
form after users solved related issues on their own. 
 
4.3. Limitations 
 
Even though Udacity may represent an exemplary 
case for a range of digital platforms that exist today, 
there are some limitations from using single case studies 
as a research method. Data collection and analysis focus 
on a MOOC platform. External validity is an inherent lim-
itation of single case studies. Hence, we cannot directly 
subsume to generalized effects of all service innovations 
within digital ecosystems. Our set of publicly available 
data from media may contain opinions of their pertaining 
authors. Thus, we narrow data selection biases by using a 
diversity of (online and offline) press releases, video 
statements, and data collected from the Udacity platform 
itself for each phase. 
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